Visible to the public Deceptive Routing GamesConflict Detection Enabled

TitleDeceptive Routing Games
Publication TypeConference Proceedings
Year of Publication2012
AuthorsQuanyan Zhu, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Andrew Clark, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Başar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Conference Name51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Date Published12/2012
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Conference LocationMaui, Hawaii
Keywordsscience of security, Toward a Theory of Resilience in Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Abstract

The use of a shared medium leaves wireless networks, including mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, vulnerable to jamming attacks. In this paper, we introduce a jamming defense mechanism for multiple-path routing networks based on maintaining deceptive flows, consisting of fake packets, between a source and a destination. An adversary observing a deceptive flow will expend energy on disrupting the fake packets, allowing the real data packets to arrive at the destination unharmed. We model this deceptive flow-based defense within a multi-stage stochastic game framework between the network nodes, which choose a routing path and flow rates for the real and fake data, and an adversary, which chooses which fraction of each flow to target at each hop. We develop an efficient, distributed procedure for computing the optimal routing at each hop and the optimal flow allocation at the destination. Furthermore, by studying the equilibria of the game, we quantify the benefit arising from deception, as reflected in an increase in the valid throughput. Our results are demonstrated via a simulation study.

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