Biblio

Deception, both offensive and defensive, is a fundamental tactic in warfare and a well-studied topic in biology. Living organisms use a variety deception tools, including mimicry, camouflage, and nocturnality. Evolutionary biologists have published a variety of formal models for deception in nature. Deception in these models is fundamentally based on misclassification of signals between the entities of the system, represented as a tripartite relation between two signal senders, the “model” and the “mimic”, and a signal receiver, called the “dupe”. Examples of relations between entities include attraction, repulsion and expected advantage gained or lost from the interaction. Using this representation, a multitude of deception systems can be described. Some deception systems in cybersecurity are well-known. Consider, for example, all of the many different varieties of “honey-things” used to ensnare attackers. The study of deception in cybersecurity is limited compared to the richness found in biology. While multiple ontologies of deception in cyberenvironments exist, these are primarily lists of terms without a greater organizing structure. This is both a lost opportunity and potentially quite dangerous: a lost opportunity because defenders may be missing useful defensive deception strategies; dangerous because defenders may be oblivious to ongoing attacks using previously unidentified types of offensive deception. In this paper, we extend deception models from biology to present a framework for identifying relations in the cyber-realm analogous to those found in nature. We show how modifications of these relations can create, enhance or on the contrary prevent deception. From these relations, we develop a framework of cyber-deception types, with examples, and a general model for cyber-deception. The signals used in cyber-systems, which are not directly tied to the “Natural” world, differ significantly from those utilized in biologic mimicry systems. However, similar concepts supporting identity exist and are discussed in brief.