Biblio

While much of the discussion around supply chain security has focused on the parts, components and gear that make up an organization's physical IT assets, a growing number of experts are making the case that vulnerabilities in the software supply chain may represent the larger cybersecurity threat over the long haul.

We need risk management solutions to assess, measure, and mitigate risk in real-time across multi-tier partner and supplier networks to achieve our goal of cost, schedule and performance, as they are only effective in a secure environment.

Another risk posed by the limited number of available vendors is the threat of supply chain attacks. According to researchers at CrowdStrike on June 27, 2017 the destructive malware known as NotPetya was deployed using a legitimate software package employed by organizations operating in Ukraine. The attack used an update mechanism built into the software to provide updates and distribute them to the vendor’s customers. This same mechanism had been used a month earlier to deploy other ransomware attacks. Supply chain attacks exploit a trust relationship between software or hardware vendors and their customers. These attacks can be widespread targeting the entire trusted vendor’s customer base and are growing in frequency as well as sophistication.

We also sought to shed light on a yet-unexamined attack vector as it translates to healthcare networks: supply chain attacks. Several high-profile breaches in recent years involved lapses in the supply chain. Furthermore, according to a health and human services public breach reporting tool, 30 percent of healthcare breaches in 2016 were due to business associates and third-party vendor breaches. To learn from these cases, we studied the different ways threat actors can take advantage of weaknesses in the supply chain to infiltrate healthcare networks.

In the digital age, drug makers have never been more exposed to cyber threats, from a wide range of actors pursuing very different motivations. These threats can have unpredictable consequences for the reliability and integrity of the pharmaceutical supply chain. Cyber threats do not have to target drug makers directly; a recent wargame by the Atlantic Council highlighted how malware affecting one entity can degrade equipment and systems functions using the same software. The NotPetya ransomware campaign in mid-2017 was not specifically interested in affecting the pharmaceutical industry, but nevertheless disrupted Merck’s HPV vaccine production line. Merck lost 310 million dollars in revenue subsequent quarter, as a result of lost productivity and a halt in production for almost a week.

STONESOUP develops and demonstrates comprehensive, automated techniques that allow end users to securely execute software without basing risk mitigations on characteristics of provenance that have a dubious relationship to security. Existing techniques to find and remove software vulnerabilities are costly, labor-intensive, and time-consuming. Many risk management decisions are therefore based on qualitative and subjective assessments of the software suppliers' trustworthiness. STONESOUP develops software analysis, confinement, and diversification techniques so that non-experts can transform questionable software into more secure versions without changing the behavior of the programs.

The Hardening Development Toolchains Against Emergent Execution Engines (HARDEN) program seeks to give developers a way to understand emergent behaviors and thereby create opportunity to choose abstractions and implementations that limit an attacker’s ability to reuse them for malicious purposes, thus stopping the unintentional creation of weird machines. HARDEN will explore novel theories and approaches and develop practical tools to anticipate, isolate, and mitigate emergent behaviors in computing systems throughout the entire software development lifecycle (SDLC).

Government agencies and the military rely upon many kinds of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) commodity Information Technology (IT) devices, including mobile phones, printers, computer workstations and many other everyday items. Each of these devices is the final product of long supply chains involving many vendors from many nations providing various components and subcomponents, including considerable amounts of software and firmware. Long supply chains provide adversaries with opportunities to insert hidden malicious functionality into this software and firmware that adversaries can exploit to accomplish harmful objectives, including exfiltration of sensitive data and sabotage of critical operations.

AI technologies have demonstrated great value to missions as diverse as space-based imagery analysis, cyberattack warning, supply chain logistics and analysis of microbiologic systems. At the same time, the failure modes of AI technologies are poorly understood. DARPA is working to address this shortfall, with focused R&D, both analytic and empirical. DARPA’s success is essential for the Department to deploy AI technologies, particularly to the tactical edge, where reliable performance is required.

CISA is tracking a significant cyber incident impacting enterprise networks across federal, state, and local governments, as well as critical infrastructure entities and other private sector organizations. An advanced persistent threat (APT) actor is responsible for compromising the SolarWinds Orion software supply chain, as well as widespread abuse of commonly used authentication mechanisms. This threat actor has the resources, patience, and expertise to gain access to and privileges over highly sensitive information if left unchecked. CISA urges organizations to prioritize measures to identify and address this threat.

Our economy is increasingly global, complex, and interconnected. It is characterized by rapid advances in information technology. IT products and services need to provide sufficient levels of cybersecurity and resilience. The timely availability of international cybersecurity standards and guidance is a dynamic and critical component for the cybersecurity and resilience of all information and communications systems and supporting infrastructures.

The Case Studies in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management series engaged with several companies that are mature in managing cyber supply chain risk. These case studies build on the Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management case studies originally published in 2015 with the goals of covering new organizations in new industries and bringing to light any changes in cyber supply chain risk management practices.

The Case Studies in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management series engaged with several companies that are mature in managing cyber supply chain risk. These case studies build on the Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management case studies originally published in 2015 with the goals of covering new organizations in new industries and bringing to light any changes in cyber supply chain risk management practices.

 

The Case Studies in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management series engaged with several companies that are leaders in managing cyber supply chain risk. These case studies build on the Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management case studies originally published in 2015 with the goals of covering new organizations in new industries and bringing to light any changes in cyber supply chain risk management practices. This case study is for the Mayo Clinic.

Cyber risk is continually evolving, meaning insurers should understand emerging risks in order to keep pace with their clients' exposures. Lloyd’s, CyberCube and Guy Carpenter have conducted an analysis detailing three scenarios which represent the most plausible routes by which a cyber attack against industrial control systems (ICS) could generate major insured losses. All three scenarios have historical precedents. The report describes how more severe events could unfold. This report considers four key industries dependent upon ICS (Manufacturing, Shipping, Energy and Transportation) and assesses precedents and the potential impact on each. The potential for physical perils represents a major turning point for the broader cyber (re)insurance ecosystem. This risk has previously been considered unlikely to materially impact the market, with cyber perils traditionally emerging in the form of non-physical losses. However, crossing the divide between information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT), along with increases in automation and the sophistication of threat actors, means it is paramount that (re)insurers carefully consider how major losses may occur and the potential impacts.

Before contracting with a supplier, vendor, manufacturer, or any other third-party organization, it is essential to review their security practices. The third-party must have a supply chain risk management program as well as a robust risk-based approach to cybersecurity and supply chain security.

The manufacturing and production industry must address physical, human, and cyber threats in order to secure their supply chains. Physical threats include climate change/natural disasters that may reduce the supply of raw materials and disrupt production of final products. Facility flaws – “guards and gates” – also present a physical threat that may allow penetration points at manufacturing sites. Malicious human actions (e.g., crime, sabotage, and terrorism) and non-malicious human actions (e.g., accidents and negligence) also threaten “just in time” manufacturing schedules. Finally, cyber threats including ransomware attacks, software supply chain exploits a means by which threat actors may compromise industrial control systems as well as corporate networks and information systems bringing production to a standstill.

Another risk posed by the limited number of available vendors is the threat of supply chain attacks. According to researchers at CrowdStrike on June 27, 2017 the destructive malware known as NotPetya was deployed using a legitimate software package employed by organizations operating in Ukraine. The attack used an update mechanism built into the software to provide updates and distribute them to the vendor’s customers. This same mechanism had been used a month earlier to deploy other ransomware attacks. Supply chain attacks exploit a trust relationship between software or hardware vendors and their customers. These attacks can be widespread targeting the entire trusted vendor’s customer base and are growing in frequency as well as sophistication.

The supply chains for advanced automobiles will continue to become increasingly complex. Furthermore, automotive OEMs will experience decreased control over the components and software implemented into their vehicles. These issues create risks to advanced vehicle technologies that must be addressed by a comprehensive and coordinated approach to end-to-end cybersecurity across the automotive supply chain.

IIoT devices are sourced in many different countries and contain many components including hardware, software, and firmware. Each of these devices and components have a supply chain that can be compromised at many points including by the manufacturer, the software libraries, the shippers, the distributors and more.

The United States needs resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains to ensure our economic prosperity and national security. Pandemics and other biological threats, cyber-attacks, climate shocks and extreme weather events, terrorist attacks, geopolitical and economic competition, and other conditions can reduce critical manufacturing capacity and the availability and integrity of critical goods, products, and services.

Foreign adversaries are increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications technology and services, which store and communicate vast amounts of sensitive information, facilitate the digital economy, and support critical infrastructure and vital emergency services, in order to commit malicious cyber-enabled actions, including eco- nomic and industrial espionage against the United States and its people.

Modern weapons systems have depended on microelectronics since the inception of integrated circuits over fifty years ago. Today, most electronics contain programmable components of ever increasing complexity. At the same time, the Department of Defense (DoD) has become a far less influential buyer in a vast, globalized supplier base. Consequently, assuring that defense electronics are free from vulnerabilities is a daunting task.

Because system configurations typically remain unchanged for very long periods of time, compromising microelectronics can create persistent vulnerabilities. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in microelectronics and embedded software can cause mission failure in modern weapons systems. Such exploitations are especially pernicious because they can be difficult to distinguish from electrical or mechanical failures and because effects can run the gamut from system degradation to system failure to system subversion.

Cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may be inserted or discovered throughout the lifecycle of a system. Of particular concern are the weapons the nation depends upon today; almost all were developed, acquired, and fielded without formal protection plans.

The exploitation of key supply chains by foreign adversaries—especially when executed in concert with cyber intrusions and insider threat activities—represents a complex and growing threat to strategically important U.S. economic sectors and critical infrastructure. The increasing reliance on foreign-owned or controlled hardware, software, or services as well as the proliferation of networking technologies, including those associated with the Internet of Things, creates vulnerabilities in our nation’s supply chains. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, foreign adversaries could compromise the integrity, trustworthiness, and authenticity of products and services that underpin government and American industry, or even subvert and disrupt critical networks and systems, operations, products, and weapons platforms in a time of crisis. We must elevate the role of supply chain security in the acquisition process.