Visible to the public Scalable Verification of Border Gateway Protocol Configurations with an SMT Solver

TitleScalable Verification of Border Gateway Protocol Configurations with an SMT Solver
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsWeitz, Konstantin, Woos, Doug, Torlak, Emina, Ernst, Michael D., Krishnamurthy, Arvind, Tatlock, Zachary
Conference NameProceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Object-Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and Applications
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4444-9
KeywordsBagpipe, BGP, correctness, domain-specific language, object oriented security, pubcrawl, Router Systems Security, Scalability, scalable verification, security scalability, solver-aided languages
Abstract

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to announce and exchange routes for de- livering packets through the internet. ISPs must carefully configure their BGP routers to ensure traffic is routed reli- ably and securely. Correctly configuring BGP routers has proven challenging in practice, and misconfiguration has led to worldwide outages and traffic hijacks. This paper presents Bagpipe, a system that enables ISPs to declaratively express BGP policies and that automatically verifies that router configurations implement such policies. The novel initial network reduction soundly reduces policy verification to a search for counterexamples in a finite space. An SMT-based symbolic execution engine performs this search efficiently. Bagpipe reduces the size of its search space using predicate abstraction and parallelizes its search using symbolic variable hoisting. Bagpipe's policy specification language is expressive: we expressed policies inferred from real AS configurations, policies from the literature, and policies for 10 Juniper TechLibrary configuration scenarios. Bagpipe is efficient: we ran it on three ASes with a total of over 240,000 lines of Cisco and Juniper BGP configuration. Bagpipe is effective: it revealed 19 policy violations without issuing any false positives.

URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2983990.2984012
DOI10.1145/2983990.2984012
Citation Keyweitz_scalable_2016