Biblio

In this paper we present a method based on linear programming that facilitates reliable safety verification of hybrid dynamical systems over the infinite time horizon subject to perturbation inputs. The verification algorithm applies the probably approximately correct (PAC) learning framework and consequently can be regarded as statistically formal verification in the sense that it provides formal safety guarantees expressed using error probabilities and confidences. The safety of hybrid systems in this framework is verified via the computation of so-called PAC barrier certificates, which can be computed by solving a linear programming problem. Based on scenario approaches, the linear program is constructed by a family of independent and identically distributed state samples. In this way we can conduct verification of hybrid dynamical systems that existing methods are not capable of dealing with. Some preliminary experiments demonstrate the performance of our approach.

Driver assist features such as adaptive cruise control (ACC) and highway assistants are becoming increasingly prevalent on commercially available vehicles. These systems are typically designed for safety and rider comfort. However, these systems are often not designed with the quality of the overall traffic flow in mind. For such a system to be beneficial to the traffic flow, it must be string stable and minimize the inter-vehicle spacing to maximize throughput, while still being safe. We propose a methodology to select autonomous driving system parameters that are both safe and string stable using the existing control framework already implemented on commercially available ACC vehicles. Optimal parameter values are selected via model-based optimization for an example highway assistant controller with path planning.

Delayed coupling between state variables occurs regularly in technical dynamic systems, especially embedded control. As it consequently is omnipresent in safety-critical domains, there is an increasing interest in the safety verifications of systems modeled by Delay Differential Equations (DDEs). In this paper, we leverage qualitative guarantees for the existence of an exponentially decreasing estimation on the solutions to DDEs as established in classical stability theory, and present a quantitative method for constructing such delay-dependent estimations, thereby facilitating a reduction of the verification problem over an unbounded temporal horizon to a bounded one. Our technique builds on the linearization technique of non-linear dynamics and spectral analysis of the linearized counterparts. We show experimentally on a set of representative benchmarks from the literature that our technique indeed extends the scope of bounded verification techniques to unbounded verification tasks. Moreover our technique is easy to implement and can be combined with any automatic tool dedicated to bounded verification of DDEs.

In the future, mixed traffic Highly Automated Vehicles (HAV) will have to resolve interactions with human operated traffic. A particular problem for HAVs is the detection of human states influencing safety, critical decisions, and driving behavior of humans. We demonstrate the value proposition of neurophysiological sensors and driver models for optimizing performance of HAVs under safety constraints in mixed traffic applications.

The exponential growth of information and communication technologies have caused a profound shift in the way humans engineer systems leading to the emergence of closed-loop systems involving strong integration and coordination of physical and cyber components, often referred to as cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Because of these disruptive changes, physical systems can now be attacked through cyberspace and cyberspace can be attacked through physical means. The paper considers security and resilience as system properties emerging from the intersection of system dynamics and the computing architecture. A modeling and simulation integration platform for experimentation and evaluation of resilient CPSs is presented using smart transportation systems as the application domain. Evaluation of resilience is based on attacker-defender games using simulations of sufficient fidelity. The platform integrates 1) realistic models of cyber and physical components and their interactions; 2) cyber attack models that focus on the impact of attacks to CPS behavior and operation; and 3) operational scenarios that can be used for evaluation of cybersecurity risks. Three case studies are presented to demonstrate the advantages of the platform: 1) vulnerability analysis of transportation networks to traffic signal tampering; 2) resilient sensor selection for forecasting traffic flow; and 3) resilient traffic signal control in the presence of denial-of-service attacks.