Economics and CPS Seminar mini-course: Asymmetric Information and Implementation

April 13, 2016
Asymmetric Information and Implementation

In advance of the talk, please consider the question, "What is information?" Come up with your definition.

In this talk, I will cover Hurwicz (1972) theorem, introduce the concepts of Mechanism Design and Implementation, and present Revelation Principle. I will discuss Maskin's implementation theorem, and examples of illustrative games with hidden information. Building on the materials of Hurwicz - Maskin - Myerson 2007 Nobel price lectures, I will highlight the relation with CPS problems. I will cover Myerson (2008) next week (April 20).

To demonstrate the powers of implementation literature, I will relate it with a recent semi-autonomous talk (routing games for parking analysis in Seattle). We will discuss the implications of Hurwicz-Maskin theorems for parking policies.

Papers for Lecture 1:

Hurwicz, L. But Who Will Guard the Guardians?. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 577585. 2008.
Maskin, E. S. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 567576. 2008.
Myerson, R. B. Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 586603. 2008.
Banerjee, S. An alternative proof of the Hurwicz (1972) impossibility theorem. Econ. Letters 44-4. 397 - 401. 1994.

Further Materials:
Hurwicz, L. Incentive Aspects of Decentralization, in Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier. 3-28, 1441-1482. 2005.
Palfrey, T. Implementation Theory, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in Aumann, R.J. and Hart, S.. Elsevier, 3-61, 2271 - 2326. 2002.
Repullo, R. A Simple Proof of Maskin's Theorem on Nash Implementation, Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 39 - 41. 1987.
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules. The Review of Economic Studies, 46-2, 185-216. 1979.
Jackson, M. O., & Wilkie, S. Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players. The Review of Economic Studies, 72(2), 543-566. 2005.
Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., & Lepinski, M. Rational secure computation and ideal mechanism design. In FOCS 2005. 46th Annual IEEE Symposium.
Athey, S., & Segal, I. An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism. Econometrica, 81(6), 24632485. 2013.
Understanding the Impact of Parking on Urban Mobility via Routing Games on Queue-Flow Networks. Daniel Calderone, Eric Mazumdar, Lillian J. Ratliff, S. Shankar Sastry.