DPA on Hardware Implementations of Ascon and Keyak
| Title | DPA on Hardware Implementations of Ascon and Keyak |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | Samwel, Niels, Daemen, Joan |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the Computing Frontiers Conference |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4487-6 |
| Keywords | Ascon, composability, Differential Power Analysis, Hardware implementations, Keccak, Keyak, Metrics, Microelectronic Security, Microelectronics Security, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency |
| Abstract | This work applies side channel analysis on hardware implementations of two CAESAR candidates, Keyak and Ascon. Both algorithms are cryptographic sponges with an iterated permutation. The algorithms share an s-box so attacks on the non-linear step of the permutation are similar. This work presents the first results of a DPA attack on Keyak using traces generated by an FPGA. A new attack is crafted for a larger sensitive variable to reduce the number of traces. It also presents and applies the first CPA attack on Ascon. Using a toy-sized threshold implementation of Ascon we try to give insight in the order of the steps of a permutation. |
| URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3075564.3079067 |
| DOI | 10.1145/3075564.3079067 |
| Citation Key | samwel_dpa_2017 |