Biblio

Drones are increasingly being used as mobile data collectors for various monitoring services. However, since they may move around in unattended hostile areas with valuable data, they can be the targets of malicious physical/cyber attacks. These attacks may aim at stealing privacy-sensitive data, including secret keys, and eavesdropping on communications between the drones and the ground station. To detect tampered drones, a code attestation technique is required. However, since attestation itself does not guarantee that the data in the drones' memory are not leaked, data collected by the drones must be protected and secret keys for secure communications must not be leaked. In this paper, we present a solution integrating techniques for software-based attestation, data encryption and secret key protection. We propose an attestation technique that fills up free memory spaces with data repositories. Data repositories consist of pseudo-random numbers that are also used to encrypt collected data. We also propose a group attestation scheme to efficiently verify the software integrity of multiple drones. Finally, to prevent secret keys from being leaked, we utilize a technique that converts short secret keys into large look-up tables. This technique prevents attackers from abusing free space in the data memory by filling up the space with the look-up tables. To evaluate the integrated solution, we implemented it on AR.Drone and Raspberry Pi.

Assured Mission Delivery Network (AMDN) is a collaborative network to support data-intensive scientific collaborations in a multi-cloud environment. Each scientific collaboration group, called a mission, specifies a set of rules to handle computing and network resources. Security is an integral part of the AMDN design since the rules must be set by authorized users and the data generated by each mission may be privacy-sensitive. In this paper, we propose a CertificateLess cryptography-based Rule-management Protocol (CL-RP) for AMDN, which supports authenticated rule registrations and updates with non-repudiation. We evaluate CL-RP through test-bed experiments and compare it with other standard protocols.