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2021-01-25
Gracy, S., Milošević, J., Sandberg, H..  2020.  Actuator Security Index for Structured Systems. 2020 American Control Conference (ACC). :2993–2998.
Given a network with a set of vulnerable actuators (and sensors), the security index of an actuator equals the minimum number of sensors and actuators that needs to be compromised so as to conduct a perfectly undetectable attack using the said actuator. This paper deals with the problem of computing actuator security indices for discrete-time LTI network systems, using a structured systems framework. We show that the actuator security index is generic, that is for almost all realizations the actuator security index remains the same. We refer to such an index as generic security index (generic index) of an actuator. Given that the security index quantifies the vulnerability of a network, the generic index is quite valuable for large scale energy systems. Our second contribution is to provide graph-theoretic conditions for computing the generic index. The said conditions are in terms of existence of linkings on appropriately-defined directed (sub)graphs. Based on these conditions, we present an algorithm for computing the generic index.
2017-12-28
Sandberg, H., Teixeira, A. M. H..  2016.  From control system security indices to attack identifiability. 2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS). :1–6.

In this paper, we investigate detectability and identifiability of attacks on linear dynamical systems that are subjected to external disturbances. We generalize a concept for a security index, which was previously introduced for static systems. The index exactly quantifies the resources necessary for targeted attacks to be undetectable and unidentifiable in the presence of disturbances. This information is useful for both risk assessment and for the design of anomaly detectors. Finally, we show how techniques from the fault detection literature can be used to decouple disturbances and to identify attacks, under certain sparsity constraints.