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Filters: Author is Pereira, Vitor  [Clear All Filters]
2020-01-27
Almeida, José Bacelar, Barbosa, Manuel, Barthe, Gilles, Campagna, Matthew, Cohen, Ernie, Grégoire, Benjamin, Pereira, Vitor, Portela, Bernardo, Strub, Pierre-Yves, Tasiran, Serdar.  2019.  A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :63–78.

We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain management protocol of Amazon Web Services' KMS (Key Management Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under standard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt development to date.

2018-01-10
Almeida, José Bacelar, Barbosa, Manuel, Barthe, Gilles, Dupressoir, François, Grégoire, Benjamin, Laporte, Vincent, Pereira, Vitor.  2017.  A Fast and Verified Software Stack for Secure Function Evaluation. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1989–2006.
We present a high-assurance software stack for secure function evaluation (SFE). Our stack consists of three components: i. a verified compiler (CircGen) that translates C programs into Boolean circuits; ii. a verified implementation of Yao's SFE protocol based on garbled circuits and oblivious transfer; and iii. transparent application integration and communications via FRESCO, an open-source framework for secure multiparty computation (MPC). CircGen is a general purpose tool that builds on CompCert, a verified optimizing compiler for C. It can be used in arbitrary Boolean circuit-based cryptography deployments. The security of our SFE protocol implementation is formally verified using EasyCrypt, a tool-assisted framework for building high-confidence cryptographic proofs, and it leverages a new formalization of garbled circuits based on the framework of Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway (CCS 2012). We conduct a practical evaluation of our approach, and conclude that it is competitive with state-of-the-art (unverified) approaches. Our work provides concrete evidence of the feasibility of building efficient, verified, implementations of higher-level cryptographic systems. All our development is publicly available.