Biblio

In 2007, Shacham published a seminal paper on Return-Oriented Programming (ROP), the first systematic formulation of code reuse. The paper has been highly influential, profoundly shaping the way we still think about code reuse today: an attacker analyzes the "geometry" of victim binary code to locate gadgets and chains these to craft an exploit. This model has spurred much research, with a rapid progression of increasingly sophisticated code reuse attacks and defenses over time. After ten years, the common perception is that state-of-the-art code reuse defenses are effective in significantly raising the bar and making attacks exceedingly hard. In this paper, we challenge this perception and show that an attacker going beyond "geometry" (static analysis) and considering the "dynamics" (dynamic analysis) of a victim program can easily find function call gadgets even in the presence of state-of-the-art code-reuse defenses. To support our claims, we present Newton, a run-time gadget-discovery framework based on constraint-driven dynamic taint analysis. Newton can model a broad range of defenses by mapping their properties into simple, stackable, reusable constraints, and automatically generate gadgets that comply with these constraints. Using Newton, we systematically map and compare state-of-the-art defenses, demonstrating that even simple interactions with popular server programs are adequate for finding gadgets for all state-of-the-art code-reuse defenses. We conclude with an nginx case study, which shows that a Newton-enabled attacker can craft attacks which comply with the restrictions of advanced defenses, such as CPI and context-sensitive CFI.