Biblio

Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is a key component in the smart grid. Transmitting data robustly and reliably between the tremendous smart meters in the AMI is one of the most crucial tasks for providing various services in smart grid. Among the many efforts for designing practical routing protocols for the AMI, the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) proposed by the IETF ROLL working group is considered the most consolidated candidate. Resent research has shown cyber attacks such as blackhole attack and version number attack can seriously damage the performance of the network implementing RPL. The main reason that RPL is vulnerable to these kinds of attacks is the lack an authentication mechanism. In this paper, we study the impact of blackhole attacks on the performance of the AMI network and proposed a new blackhole attack that can bypass the existing defense mechanism. Then, we propose a cuckoo filter based RPL to defend the AMI network from blackhole attacks. We also give the security analysis of the proposed method.

Smart grid1 is a modern power transmission network. With its development, the computing, communication and physical processes is getting more and more connected. However, an adversary can destroy power production by attacking the power secondary equipment. Accurate and fast response to cyber-attacks is a prerequisite for stable grid operation. Therefore, it is critical to identify and classify attacks in the smart grid. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that utilizes machine learning algorithms to help classify cyber-attacks. We built a deep neural network (DNN) model and select the global optimal parameters to achieve high generalization performance. The evaluation result demonstrates that the proposed method can effectively identify cyber-attacks in smart grid with an accuracy as high as 96%.

Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems (VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though "hidden", are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a totally inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f textgreater 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated low-frequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validated DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions, and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.