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2021-06-24
Stöckle, Patrick, Grobauer, Bernd, Pretschner, Alexander.  2020.  Automated Implementation of Windows-related Security-Configuration Guides. 2020 35th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE). :598—610.
Hardening is the process of configuring IT systems to ensure the security of the systems' components and data they process or store. The complexity of contemporary IT infrastructures, however, renders manual security hardening and maintenance a daunting task. In many organizations, security-configuration guides expressed in the SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) are used as a basis for hardening, but these guides by themselves provide no means for automatically implementing the required configurations. In this paper, we propose an approach to automatically extract the relevant information from publicly available security-configuration guides for Windows operating systems using natural language processing. In a second step, the extracted information is verified using the information of available settings stored in the Windows Administrative Template files, in which the majority of Windows configuration settings is defined. We show that our implementation of this approach can extract and implement 83% of the rules without any manual effort and 96% with minimal manual effort. Furthermore, we conduct a study with 12 state-of-the-art guides consisting of 2014 rules with automatic checks and show that our tooling can implement at least 97% of them correctly. We have thus significantly reduced the effort of securing systems based on existing security-configuration guides. In many organizations, security-configuration guides expressed in the SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) are used as a basis for hardening, but these guides by themselves provide no means for automatically implementing the required configurations. In this paper, we propose an approach to automatically extract the relevant information from publicly available security-configuration guides for Windows operating systems using natural language processing. In a second step, the extracted information is verified using the information of available settings stored in the Windows Administrative Template files, in which the majority of Windows configuration settings is defined. We show that our implementation of this approach can extract and implement 83% of the rules without any manual effort and 96% with minimal manual effort. Furthermore, we conduct a study with 12 state-of-the-art guides consisting of 2014 rules with automatic checks and show that our tooling can implement at least 97% of them correctly. We have thus significantly reduced the effort of securing systems based on existing security-configuration guides. In this paper, we propose an approach to automatically extract the relevant information from publicly available security-configuration guides for Windows operating systems using natural language processing. In a second step, the extracted information is verified using the information of available settings stored in the Windows Administrative Template files, in which the majority of Windows configuration settings is defined. We show that our implementation of this approach can extract and implement 83% of the rules without any manual effort and 96% with minimal manual effort. Furthermore, we conduct a study with 12 state-of-the-art guides consisting of 2014 rules with automatic checks and show that our tooling can implement at least 97% of them correctly. We have thus significantly reduced the effort of securing systems based on existing security-configuration guides. We show that our implementation of this approach can extract and implement 83% of the rules without any manual effort and 96% with minimal manual effort. Furthermore, we conduct a study with 12 state-of-the-art guides consisting of 2014 rules with automatic checks and show that our tooling can implement at least 97% of them correctly. We have thus significantly reduced the effort of securing systems based on existing security-configuration guides.
2018-04-11
Gascon, Hugo, Grobauer, Bernd, Schreck, Thomas, Rist, Lukas, Arp, Daniel, Rieck, Konrad.  2017.  Mining Attributed Graphs for Threat Intelligence. Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. :15–22.

Understanding and fending off attack campaigns against organizations, companies and individuals, has become a global struggle. As today's threat actors become more determined and organized, isolated efforts to detect and reveal threats are no longer effective. Although challenging, this situation can be significantly changed if information about security incidents is collected, shared and analyzed across organizations. To this end, different exchange data formats such as STIX, CyBOX, or IODEF have been recently proposed and numerous CERTs are adopting these threat intelligence standards to share tactical and technical threat insights. However, managing, analyzing and correlating the vast amount of data available from different sources to identify relevant attack patterns still remains an open problem. In this paper we present Mantis, a platform for threat intelligence that enables the unified analysis of different standards and the correlation of threat data trough a novel type-agnostic similarity algorithm based on attributed graphs. Its unified representation allows the security analyst to discover similar and related threats by linking patterns shared between seemingly unrelated attack campaigns through queries of different complexity. We evaluate the performance of Mantis as an information retrieval system for threat intelligence in different experiments. In an evaluation with over 14,000 CyBOX objects, the platform enables retrieving relevant threat reports with a mean average precision of 80%, given only a single object from an incident, such as a file or an HTTP request. We further illustrate the performance of this analysis in two case studies with the attack campaigns Stuxnet and Regin.