Biblio

Mixr is a novel moving target defense (MTD) system that improves on the traditional address space layout randomization (ASLR) security technique by giving security architects the tools to add "runtime ASLR" to existing software programs and libraries without access to their source code or debugging information and without requiring changes to the host's linker, loader or kernel. Runtime ASLR systems rerandomize the code of a program/library throughout execution at rerandomization points and with a particular granularity. The security professional deploying the Mixr system on a program/library has the flexibility to specify the frequency of runtime rerandomization and the granularity. For example, she/he can specify that the program rerandomizes itself on 60-byte boundaries every time the write() system call is invoked. The Mixr MTD of runtime ASLR protects binary programs and software libraries that are vulnerable to information leaks and attacks based on that information. Mixr is an improvement on the state of the art in runtime ASLR systems. Mixr gives the security architect the flexibility to specify the rerandomization points and granularity and does not require access to the target program/library's source code, debugging information or other metadata. Nor does Mixr require changes to the host's linker, loader or kernel to execute the protected software. No existing runtime ASLR system offers those capabilities. The tradeoff is that applying the Mixr MTD of runtime ASLR protection requires successful disassembly of a program - something which is not always possible. Moreoever, the runtime overhead of a Mixr-protected program is non-trivial. Mixr, besides being a tool for implementing the MTD of runtime ASLR, has the potential to further improve software security in other ways. For example, Mixr could be deployed to implement noise injection into software to thwart side-channel attacks using differential power analysis.