Biblio

Insider attacks are one of the most dangerous threats to an organization. Unfortunately, they are very difficult to foresee, detect, and defend against due to the trust and responsibilities placed on the employees. In this paper, we first define the notion of user intent, and construct a model for the most common threat scenario used in the literature that poses a very high risk for sensitive data stored in the organization's database. We show that the complexity of identifying pseudo-intents of a user is coNP-Complete in this domain, and launching a harvester insider attack within the boundaries of the defined threat model takes linear time while a targeted threat model is an NP-Complete problem. We also discuss about the general defense mechanisms against the modeled threats, and show that countering against the harvester insider attack model takes quadratic time while countering against the targeted insider attack model can take linear to quadratic time depending on the strategy chosen. Finally, we analyze the adversarial behavior, and show that launching an attack with minimum risk is also an NP-Complete problem.