Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Schwenk, Jörg  [Clear All Filters]
2018-09-28
Felsch, Dennis, Mainka, Christian, Mladenov, Vladislav, Schwenk, Jörg.  2017.  SECRET: On the Feasibility of a Secure, Efficient, and Collaborative Real-Time Web Editor. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :835–848.
Real-time editing tools like Google Docs, Microsoft Office Online, or Etherpad have changed the way of collaboration. Many of these tools are based on Operational Transforms (OT), which guarantee that the views of different clients onto a document remain consistent over time. Usually, documents and operations are exposed to the server in plaintext – and thus to administrators, governments, and potentially cyber criminals. Therefore, it is highly desirable to work collaboratively on encrypted documents. Previous implementations do not unleash the full potential of this idea: They either require large storage, network, and computation overhead, are not real-time collaborative, or do not take the structure of the document into account. The latter simplifies the approach since only OT algorithms for byte sequences are required, but the resulting ciphertexts are almost four times the size of the corresponding plaintexts. We present SECRET, the first secure, efficient, and collaborative real-time editor. In contrast to all previous works, SECRET is the first tool that (1.) allows the encryption of whole documents or arbitrary sub-parts thereof, (2.) uses a novel combination of tree-based OT with a structure preserving encryption, and (3.) requires only a modern browser without any extra software installation or browser extension. We evaluate our implementation and show that its encryption overhead is three times smaller in comparison to all previous approaches. SECRET can even be used by multiple users in a low-bandwidth scenario. The source code of SECRET is published on GitHub as an open-source project:https://github.com/RUB-NDS/SECRET/
2018-06-07
Detering, Dennis, Somorovsky, Juraj, Mainka, Christian, Mladenov, Vladislav, Schwenk, Jörg.  2017.  On The (In-)Security Of JavaScript Object Signing And Encryption. Proceedings of the 1st Reversing and Offensive-oriented Trends Symposium. :3:1–3:11.

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) has evolved to the de-facto standard file format in the web used for application configuration, cross- and same-origin data exchange, as well as in Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols such as OpenID Connect. To protect integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of sensitive data, JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) was created to apply cryptographic mechanisms directly in JSON messages. We investigate the security of JOSE and present different applicable attacks on several popular libraries. We introduce JOSEPH (JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption Pentesting Helper) – our newly developed Burp Suite extension, which automatically performs security analysis on targeted applications. JOSEPH's automatic vulnerability detection ranges from executing simple signature exclusion or signature faking techniques, which neglect JSON message integrity, up to highly complex cryptographic Bleichenbacher attacks, breaking the confidentiality of encrypted JSON messages. We found severe vulnerabilities in six popular JOSE libraries. We responsibly disclosed all weaknesses to the developers and helped them to provide fixes.