Biblio

We present a binary static analysis approach to detect intelligent electronic device (IED) malware based on the time requirements of electrical substations. We explore graph theory techniques to model the timing performance of an IED executable. Timing performance is subsequently used as a metric for IED malware detection. More specifically, we perform a series of steps to reduce a part of the IED malware detection problem into a classical problem of graph theory, namely finding single-source shortest paths on a weighted directed acyclic graph (DAG). Shortest paths represent execution flows that take the longest time to compute. Their clock cycles are examined to determine if they violate the real-time nature of substation monitoring and control, in which case IED malware detection is attained. We did this work with particular reference to implementations of protection and control algorithms that use the IEC 61850 standard for substation data representation and network communication. We tested our approach against IED exploits and malware, network scanning code, and numerous malware samples involved in recent ICS malware campaigns.