Biblio

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) play a vital role in the development of smart cities. They enable various road safety and efficiency applications such as optimized traffic management, collision avoidance, and pollution control through the collection and evaluation of traffic data from Road Side Units (RSUs) and connected vehicles in real time. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to data corruption attacks which can seriously influence their decision-making abilities. Traditional attack detection schemes do not account for attackers' sophisticated and evolving strategies and ignore the ITS's constraints on security resources. In this paper, we devise a security game model that allows the defense mechanism deployed in the ITS to optimize the distribution of available resources for attack detection while considering mixed attack strategies, according to which the attacker targets multiple RSUs in a distributed fashion. In our security game, the utility of the ITS is quantified in terms of detection rate, attack damage, and the relevance of the information transmitted by the RSUs. The proposed approach will enable the ITS to mitigate the impact of attacks and increase its resiliency. The results show that our approach reduces the attack impact by at least 20% compared to the one that fairly allocates security resources to RSUs indifferently to attackers' strategies.

Cloud federations allow Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) to deliver more efficient service performance by interconnecting their Cloud environments and sharing their resources. However, the security of the federated Cloud service could be compromised if the resources are shared with relatively insecure and unreliable CSPs. In this paper, we propose a Cloud federation formation model that considers the security risk levels of CSPs. We start by quantifying the security risk of CSPs according to well defined evaluation criteria related to security risk avoidance and mitigation, then we model the Cloud federation formation process as a hedonic coalitional game with a preference relation that is based on the security risk levels and reputations of CSPs. We propose a federation formation algorithm that enables CSPs to cooperate while considering the security risk introduced to their infrastructures, and refrain from cooperating with undesirable CSPs. According to the stability-based solution concepts that we use to evaluate the game, the model shows that CSPs will be able to form acceptable federations on the fly to service incoming resource provisioning requests whenever required.