Biblio

With the considerable success achieved by modern fuzzing in-frastructures, more crashes are produced than ever before. To dig out the root cause, rapid and faithful crash triage for large numbers of crashes has always been attractive. However, hindered by the practical difficulty of reducing analysis imprecision without compromising efficiency, this goal has not been accomplished. In this paper, we present an end-to-end crash triage solution Default, for accurately and quickly pinpointing unique root cause from large numbers of crashes. In particular, we quantify the “crash relevance” of program entities based on mutual information, which serves as the criterion of unique crash bucketing and allows us to bucket massive crashes without pre-analyzing their root cause. The quantification of “crash relevance” is also used in the shortening of long crashing traces. On this basis, we use the interpretability of neural networks to precisely pinpoint the root cause in the shortened traces by evaluating each basic block's impact on the crash label. Evaluated with 20 programs with 22216 crashes in total, Default demonstrates remarkable accuracy and performance, which is way beyond what the state-of-the-art techniques can achieve: crash de-duplication was achieved at a super-fast processing speed - 0.017 seconds per crashing trace, without missing any unique bugs. After that, it identifies the root cause of 43 unique crashes with no false negatives and an average false positive rate of 9.2%.

Single Root I/O Virtualization (SRIOV) allows one physical device to be used by multiple virtual machines simultaneously without the mediation from the hypervisor. Such technique significantly decreases the overhead of I/O virtualization. But according to our latest findings, in the meantime, it introduces a high-risk security issue that enables an adversary-controlled VM to cut off the connectivity of the host machine, given the limited filtering capabilities provided by the SRIOV devices. As showcase, we demonstrate two attacks against SRIOV NIC by exploiting a vulnerability in the standard network management protocol, OAM. The vulnerability surfaces because SRIOV NICs treat the packets passing through OAM as data-plane packets and allow untrusted VMs to send and receive these packets on behalf of the host. By examining several off-the-shelf SRIOV NICs and switches, we show such attack can easily turn off the network connection within a short period of time. In the end, we propose a defense mechanism which runs on the existing hardware and can be readily deployed.