Visible to the public Biblio

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2019-02-08
Thimmaraju, Kashyap, Shastry, Bhargava, Fiebig, Tobias, Hetzelt, Felicitas, Seifert, Jean-Pierre, Feldmann, Anja, Schmid, Stefan.  2018.  Taking Control of SDN-Based Cloud Systems via the Data Plane. Proceedings of the Symposium on SDN Research. :1:1-1:15.

Virtual switches are a crucial component of SDN-based cloud systems, enabling the interconnection of virtual machines in a flexible and "software-defined" manner. This paper raises the alarm on the security implications of virtual switches. In particular, we show that virtual switches not only increase the attack surface of the cloud, but virtual switch vulnerabilities can also lead to attacks of much higher impact compared to traditional switches. We present a systematic security analysis and identify four design decisions which introduce vulnerabilities. Our findings motivate us to revisit existing threat models for SDN-based cloud setups, and introduce a new attacker model for SDN-based cloud systems using virtual switches. We demonstrate the practical relevance of our analysis using a case study with Open vSwitch and OpenStack. Employing a fuzzing methodology, we find several exploitable vulnerabilities in Open vSwitch. Using just one vulnerability we were able to create a worm that can compromise hundreds of servers in a matter of minutes. Our findings are applicable beyond virtual switches: NFV and high-performance fast path implementations face similar issues. This paper also studies various mitigation techniques and discusses how to redesign virtual switches for their integration.

2019-01-31
Buhren, Robert, Hetzelt, Felicitas, Pirnay, Niklas.  2018.  On the Detectability of Control Flow Using Memory Access Patterns. Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. :48–53.

Shielding systems such as AMD's Secure Encrypted Virtualization aim to protect a virtual machine from a higher privileged entity such as the hypervisor. A cornerstone of these systems is the ability to protect the memory from unauthorized accesses. Despite this protection mechanism, previous attacks leveraged the control over memory resources to infer control flow of applications running in a shielded system. While previous works focused on a specific target application, there has been no general analysis on how the control flow of a protected application can be inferred. This paper tries to overcome this gap by providing a detailed analysis on the detectability of control flow using memory access patterns. To that end, we do not focus on a specific shielding system or a specific target application, but present a framework which can be applied to different types of shielding systems as well as to different types of attackers. By training a random forest classifier on the memory accesses emitted by syscalls of a shielded entity, we show that it is possible to infer the control flow of shielded entities with a high degree of accuracy.