Biblio

Close physical proximity among wireless devices that have never shared a secret key is sometimes used as a basis of trust. In these cases, devices in close proximity are deemed trustworthy while more distant devices are viewed as potential adversaries. Because radio waves are invisible, however, a user may believe a wireless device is communicating with a nearby device when in fact the user's device is communicating with a distant adversary. Researchers have previously proposed methods for multi-antenna devices to ascertain physical proximity with other devices, but devices with a single antenna, such as those commonly used in the Internet of Things, cannot take advantage of these techniques. We investigate a method for a single-antenna Wi-Fi device to quickly determine proximity with another Wi-Fi device. Our approach leverages the repeating nature Wi-Fi's preamble and the characteristics of a transmitting antenna's near field to detect proximity with high probability. Our method never falsely declares proximity at ranges longer than 14 cm.

This paper presents work towards realizing architectural support for Bluetooth Trusted I/O on SGX-enabled platforms, with the goal of providing I/O data protection that does not rely on system software security. Indeed, we are primarily concerned with protecting I/O from all software adversaries, including privileged software. In this paper we describe the challenges in designing and implementing Trusted I/O at the architectural level for Bluetooth. We propose solutions to these challenges. In addition, we describe our proof-of-concept work that extends existing over-the-air Bluetooth security all the way to an SGX enclave by securing user data between the Bluetooth Controller and an SGX enclave.