Biblio

The globalization of the integrated circuit supply chain has given rise to major security concerns ranging from intellectual property piracy to hardware Trojans. Logic encryption is a promising solution to tackle these threats. Recently, a Boolean satisfiability attack capable of unlocking existing logic encryption techniques was introduced. This attack initiated a paradigm shift in the design of logic encryption algorithms. However, recent approaches have been strongly focusing on low-cost countermeasures that unfortunately lead to low functional and structural corruption. In this paper, we show that a simple approach can offer provable security and more than 99% corruption if a higher area overhead is accepted. Our results strongly suggest that future proposals should consider higher overheads or more realistic circuit sizes for the evaluation of modern logic encryption algorithms.

The globalization of the IC supply chain has brought forth the era of fabless companies. Due to security issues during design and fabrication processes, various security concerns have risen, ranging from IP piracy and reverse engineering to hardware Trojans. Logic encryption has emerged as a mitigation against these threats. However, no generic metrics for quantifying the security of logic encryption algorithms has been reported so far, making it impossible to formally compare different approaches. In this paper, we propose a unifying metric, capturing the key security aspects of logic encryption algorithms. The metric is evaluated on state-of-the-art algorithms and benchmarks.