Biblio
Nuclear weapons have re-emerged as one the main global security challenges of our time. Any further reductions in the nuclear arsenals will have to rely on robust verification mechanisms. This requires, in particular, trusted measurement systems to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads based on their radiation signatures. These signatures are considered extremely sensitive information, and inspection systems have to be designed to protect them. To accomplish this task, so-called information barriers" have been proposed. These devices process sensitive information acquired during an inspection, but only display results in a pass/fail manner. Traditional inspection systems rely on complex electronics both for data acquisition and processing. Several research efforts have produced prototype systems, but after almost thirty years of research and development, no viable and widely accepted system has emerged. This talk highlights recent efforts to overcome this impasse. A first approach is to avoid electronics in critical parts of the measurement process altogether and to rely instead on physical phenomena to detect radiation and to confirm a unique fingerprint of the inspected warhead using a zero-knowledge protocol. A second approach is based on a radiation detection system using vintage electronics built around a 6502 processor. Hardware designed in the distant past, at a time when its use for sensitive measurements was never envisioned, may drastically reduce concerns that another party implemented backdoors or hidden switches. Sensitive information is only stored on traditional punched cards. The talk concludes with a roadmap and highlights opportunities for researchers from the hardware security community to make critical contributions to nuclear arms control and global security in the years ahead.