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2022-02-24
Gao, Wei, Guo, Shangwei, Zhang, Tianwei, Qiu, Han, Wen, Yonggang, Liu, Yang.  2021.  Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Learning with Automatic Transformation Search. 2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). :114–123.
Collaborative learning has gained great popularity due to its benefit of data privacy protection: participants can jointly train a Deep Learning model without sharing their training sets. However, recent works discovered that an adversary can fully recover the sensitive training samples from the shared gradients. Such reconstruction attacks pose severe threats to collaborative learning. Hence, effective mitigation solutions are urgently desired.In this paper, we propose to leverage data augmentation to defeat reconstruction attacks: by preprocessing sensitive images with carefully-selected transformation policies, it becomes infeasible for the adversary to extract any useful information from the corresponding gradients. We design a novel search method to automatically discover qualified policies. We adopt two new metrics to quantify the impacts of transformations on data privacy and model usability, which can significantly accelerate the search speed. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that the policies discovered by our method can defeat existing reconstruction attacks in collaborative learning, with high efficiency and negligible impact on the model performance.
2019-11-12
Zhang, Tianwei, Zhang, Yinqian, Lee, Ruby B..  2018.  Analyzing Cache Side Channels Using Deep Neural Networks. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. :174-186.

Cache side-channel attacks aim to breach the confidentiality of a computer system and extract sensitive secrets through CPU caches. In the past years, different types of side-channel attacks targeting a variety of cache architectures have been demonstrated. Meanwhile, different defense methods and systems have also been designed to mitigate these attacks. However, quantitatively evaluating the effectiveness of these attacks and defenses has been challenging. We propose a generic approach to evaluating cache side-channel attacks and defenses. Specifically, our method builds a deep neural network with its inputs as the adversary's observed information, and its outputs as the victim's execution traces. By training the neural network, the relationship between the inputs and outputs can be automatically discovered. As a result, the prediction accuracy of the neural network can serve as a metric to quantify how much information the adversary can obtain correctly, and how effective a defense solution is in reducing the information leakage under different attack scenarios. Our evaluation suggests that the proposed method can effectively evaluate different attacks and defenses.