Biblio

Natural disasters and cyber intrusions threaten the normal operation of the critical electric grid infrastructure. There is still no widely accepted methodology to quantify the resilience in power systems. In this work, power system resiliency refers to the ability of the system to keep provide energy to the critical load even with adverse events. A significant amount of work has been done to quantify the resilience for distribution systems. Even though critical loads are located in distribution system, transmission system play a critical role in supplying energy to distribution feeder in addition to the Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). This work focuses on developing a framework to quantify the resiliency of cyber-physical transmission systems. Quantifying the resiliency of the transmission network, is important to determine and devise suitable control mechanisms to minimize the effects of undesirable events in the power grid. The proposed metric is based on both system infrastructure and with changing operating conditions. A graphical analysis along with measure of critical parameters of the network is performed to quantify the redundancy and vulnerabilities in the physical network of the system. A similar approach is used to quantify the cyber-resiliency. The results indicate the capability of the proposed framework to quantify cyber-physical resilience of the transmission systems.

Recent cyber attacks on the power grid have been of increasing complexity and sophistication. In order to understand the impact of cyber-attacks on the power system resiliency, it is important to consider an holistic cyber-physical system specially with increasing industrial automation. In this work, device level resilience properties of the various controllers and their impact on the microgrid resiliency is studied. In addition, a cyber-physical resiliency metric considering vulnerabilities, system model, and device level properties is proposed. A use case is presented inspired by the recent Ukraine cyber-attack. A use case has been presented to demonstrate application of the developed cyber-physical resiliency metric to enhance situational awareness of the operator, and enable better control actions to improve resiliency.

In contrast to other studies in IC supply chain security where foundries are classified as either untrusted or trusted, a more realistic threat model is that the foundries are legally and economically obliged to perform trustworthy service, and it is the individual employees that introduce security risks. We call the above as the trusted foundry and untrusted employee (TFUE) model. Based on this model, we investigate new opportunities of establishing trustworthy operations in foundries made possible by double patterning lithography (DPL). DPL is used to setup two independent mask development lines which do not need to share any information. Under this setup, we consider the attack model where the untrusted employee(s) may try to insert Trojans into the circuit. As a countermeasure, we customize DPL to decompose the layout into two sub-layouts in such a way that each sub-layout individually expose minimum information to the untrusted employee.

Due to design and fabrication outsourcing to foundries, the problem of malicious modifications to integrated circuits known as hardware Trojans has attracted attention in academia as well as industry. To reduce the risks associated with Trojans, researchers have proposed different approaches to detect them. Among these approaches, test-time detection approaches have drawn the greatest attention and most approaches assume the existence of a “golden model”. Prior works suggest using reverse-engineering to identify such Trojan-free ICs for the golden model but they did not state how to do this efficiently. In this paper, we propose an innovative and robust reverseengineering approach to identify the Trojan-free ICs. We adapt a well-studied machine learning method, one-class support vector machine, to solve our problem. Simulation results using state-of-the-art tools on several publicly available circuits show that our approach can detect hardware Trojans with high accuracy rate across different modeling and algorithm parameters.

To protect complex power-grid control networks, power operators need efficient security assessment techniques that take into account both cyber side and the power side of the cyber-physical critical infrastructures. In this paper, we present CPINDEX, a security-oriented stochastic risk management technique that calculates cyber-physical security indices to measure the security level of the underlying cyber-physical setting. CPINDEX installs appropriate cyber-side instrumentation probes on individual host systems to dynamically capture and profile low-level system activities such as interprocess communications among operating system assets. CPINDEX uses the generated logs along with the topological information about the power network configuration to build stochastic Bayesian network models of the whole cyber-physical infrastructure and update them dynamically based on the current state of the underlying power system. Finally, CPINDEX implements belief propagation algorithms on the created stochastic models combined with a novel graph-theoretic power system indexing algorithm to calculate the cyber-physical index, i.e., to measure the security-level of the system's current cyber-physical state. The results of our experiments with actual attacks against a real-world power control network shows that CPINDEX, within few seconds, can efficiently compute the numerical indices during the attack that indicate the progressing malicious attack correctly.