Biblio

Voice controlled interfaces have vastly improved the usability of many devices (e.g., headless IoT systems). Unfortunately, the lack of authentication for these interfaces has also introduced command injection vulnerabilities - whether via compromised IoT devices, television ads or simply malicious nearby neighbors, causing such devices to perform unauthenticated sensitive commands is relatively easy. We address these weaknesses with Two Microphone Authentication (2MA), which takes advantage of the presence of multiple ambient and personal devices operating in the same area. We develop an embodiment of 2MA that combines approximate localization through Direction of Arrival (DOA) techniques with Robust Audio Hashes (RSHs). Our results show that our 2MA system can localize a source to within a narrow physical cone (\$\textbackslashtextless30ˆ\textbackslashtextbackslashcirc \$) with zero false positives, eliminate replay attacks and prevent the injection of inaudible/hidden commands. As such, we dramatically increase the difficulty for an adversary to carry out such attacks and demonstrate that 2MA is an effective means of authenticating and localizing voice commands.