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2022-12-20
von Zezschwitz, Emanuel, Chen, Serena, Stark, Emily.  2022.  "It builds trust with the customers" - Exploring User Perceptions of the Padlock Icon in Browser UI. 2022 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :44–50.
We performed a large-scale online survey (n=1,880) to study the padlock icon, an established security indicator in web browsers that denotes connection security through HTTPS. In this paper, we evaluate users’ understanding of the padlock icon, and how removing or replacing it might influence their expectations and decisions. We found that the majority of respondents (89%) had misconceptions about the padlock’s meaning. While only a minority (23%-44%) referred to the padlock icon at all when asked to evaluate trustworthiness, these padlock-aware users reported that they would be deterred from a hypothetical shopping transaction when the padlock icon was absent. These users were reassured after seeing secondary UI surfaces (i.e., Chrome Page Info) where more verbose information about connection security was present.We conclude that the padlock icon, displayed by browsers in the address bar, is still misunderstood by many users. The padlock icon guarantees connection security, but is often perceived to indicate the general privacy, security, and trustworthiness of a website. We argue that communicating connection security precisely and clearly is likely to be more effective through secondary UI, where there is more surface area for content. We hope that this paper boosts the discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of showing passive security indicators in the browser UI.
ISSN: 2770-8411
2020-01-02
Muszynska, Maria, Michels, Denise, von Zezschwitz, Emanuel.  2018.  Not On My Phone: Exploring Users' Conception of Related Permissions. Extended Abstracts of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. :LBW508:1–LBW508:6.

Many smartphone security mechanisms prompt users to decide on sensitive resource requests. This approach fails if corresponding implications are not understood. Prior work identified ineffective user interfaces as a cause for insufficient comprehension and proposed augmented dialogs. We hypothesize that, prior to interface-design, efficient security dialogs require an underlying permission model based on user demands. We believe, that only an implementation which corresponds to users\guillemotright mental models, in terms of the handling, granularity and grouping of permission requests, allows for informed decisions. In this work, we propose a study design which leverages materialization for the extraction of the mental models. We present preliminary results of three Focus Groups. The findings indicate that the materialization provided sufficient support for non-experts to understand and discuss this complex topic. In addition to this, the results indicate that current permission approaches do not match users\guillemotright demands for information and control.