Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Badonnel, R.  [Clear All Filters]
2018-03-05
Schnepf, N., Badonnel, R., Lahmadi, A., Merz, S..  2017.  Automated Verification of Security Chains in Software-Defined Networks with Synaptic. 2017 IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). :1–9.

Software-defined networks provide new facilities for deploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect the infrastructures, by combining different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics, are consistent and do not include security violations. We propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the verification of security chains in software-defined networks. It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification methods for checking both the control and data planes of these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms for translating specifications of security chains into formal models that can then be verified by SMT1 solving or model checking. Our solution is prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv checkers.

Schnepf, N., Badonnel, R., Lahmadi, A., Merz, S..  2017.  Automated Verification of Security Chains in Software-Defined Networks with Synaptic. 2017 IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). :1–9.
Software-defined networks provide new facilities for deploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect the infrastructures, by combining different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics, are consistent and do not include security violations. We propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the verification of security chains in software-defined networks. It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification methods for checking both the control and data planes of these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms for translating specifications of security chains into formal models that can then be verified by SMT1 solving or model checking. Our solution is prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv checkers.
2015-05-06
Barrere, M., Badonnel, R., Festor, O..  2014.  Vulnerability Assessment in Autonomic Networks and Services: A Survey. Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE. 16:988-1004.

Autonomic networks and services are exposed to a large variety of security risks. The vulnerability management process plays a crucial role for ensuring their safe configurations and preventing security attacks. We focus in this survey on the assessment of vulnerabilities in autonomic environments. In particular, we analyze current methods and techniques contributing to the discovery, the description and the detection of these vulnerabilities. We also point out important challenges that should be faced in order to fully integrate this process into the autonomic management plane.