Biblio

Botnets are a well recognized global cyber-security threat as they enable attack communities to command large collections of compromised computers (bots) on-demand. Peer to-peer (P2P) distributed hash tables (DHT) have become particularly attractive botnet command and control (C & C) solutions due to the high level resiliency gained via the diffused random graph overlays they produce. The injection of Sybils, computers pretending to be valid bots, remains a key defensive strategy against DHT-structured P2P botnets. This research uses packet level network simulations to explore the relative merits of random, informed, and partially informed Sybil placement strategies. It is shown that random placements perform nearly as effectively as the tested more informed strategies, which require higher levels of inter-defender co-ordination. Moreover, it is shown that aspects of the DHT-structured P2P botnets behave as statistically nonergodic processes, when viewed from the perspective of stochastic processes. This suggests that although optimal Sybil placement strategies appear to exist they would need carefully tuning to each specific P2P botnet instance.