Biblio

Supply chain management systems (SCM) are the most intensive and statistical RFID application for object tracking. A lot of research has been carried out to overcome security issues in the field of online/offline object tracking as well as authentication protocols involving RFID technology. Due to advancements with the Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded systems in object tracking schemes the latest research manages to deliver information about the object’s location as well as provide particulars about the state of an object. Recent research presented a proposal for an authentication and online object tracking protocol focusing on solutions for privacy issues for device identification, end-to-end authentication, and secure online object tracking. However, recent schemes have been found to be vulnerable to traceability attacks. This paper presents an enhanced end-to-end authentication scheme where the identity of the user is kept anonymous so that its actions can not be tracked, eliminating attacks related to traceability. The security of the proposed protocol is formally analyzed using the attack model of the automated security testing tool, ProVerif. The proposed scheme outperforms competing schemes based on security.

Owing to the advancements in communication media and devices all over the globe, there has arisen a dire need for to limit the alarming number of attacks targeting these and to enhance their security. Multiple techniques have been incorporated in different researches and various protocols and schemes have been put forward to cater security issues of session initiation protocol (SIP). In 2008, Qiu et al. presented a proposal for SIP authentication which while effective than many existing schemes, was still found vulnerable to many security attacks. To overcome those issues, Zhang et al. proposed an authentication protocol. This paper presents the analysis of Zhang et al. authentication scheme and concludes that their proposed scheme is susceptible to user traceablity. It also presents an improved SIP authentication scheme that eliminates the possibility of traceability of user's activities. The proposed scheme is also verified by contemporary verification tool, ProVerif and it is found to be more secure, efficient and practical than many similar SIP authetication scheme.

With the emergence of IoT, wearable devices are drawing attention and becoming part of our daily life. These wearable devices collect private information about their wearers. Mostly, a secure authentication process is used to verify a legitimate user that relies on the mobile terminal. Similarly, remote cloud services are used for verification and authentication of both wearable devices and wearers. Security is necessary to preserve the privacy of users. Some traditional authentication protocols are proposed which have vulnerabilities and are prone to different attacks like forgery, de-synchronization, and un-traceability issues. To address these vulnerabilities, recently, Wu et al. (2017) proposed a cloud-assisted authentication scheme which is costly in terms of computations required. Therefore this paper proposed an improved, lightweight and computationally efficient authentication scheme for wearable devices. The proposed scheme provides similar level of security as compared to Wu's (2017) scheme but requires 41.2% lesser computations.

Authentication is achieved by using different techniques, like using smart-card, identity password and biometric techniques. Some of the proposed schemes use a single factor for authentication while others combine multiple ways to provide multi-factor authentication for better security. lately, a new scheme for multi-factor authentication was presented by Cao and Ge and claimed that their scheme is highly secure and can withstand against all known attacks. In this paper, it is revealed that their scheme is still vulnerable and have some loopholes in term of reflection attack. Therefore, an improved scheme is proposed to overcome the security weaknesses of Cao and Ge's scheme. The proposed scheme resists security attacks and secure. Formal testing is carried out under a broadly-accepted simulated tool ProVerif which demonstrates that the proposed scheme is well secure.