Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Ni, Zhen  [Clear All Filters]
2021-10-12
Paul, Shuva, Ni, Zhen, Ding, Fei.  2020.  An Analysis of Post Attack Impacts and Effects of Learning Parameters on Vulnerability Assessment of Power Grid. 2020 IEEE Power Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT). :1–5.
Due to the increasing number of heterogeneous devices connected to electric power grid, the attack surface increases the threat actors. Game theory and machine learning are being used to study the power system failures caused by external manipulation. Most of existing works in the literature focus on one-shot process of attacks and fail to show the dynamic evolution of the defense strategy. In this paper, we focus on an adversarial multistage sequential game between the adversaries of the smart electric power transmission and distribution system. We study the impact of exploration rate and convergence of the attack strategies (sequences of action that creates large scale blackout based on the system capacity) based on the reinforcement learning approach. We also illustrate how the learned attack actions disrupt the normal operation of the grid by creating transmission line outages, bus voltage violations, and generation loss. This simulation studies are conducted on IEEE 9 and 39 bus systems. The results show the improvement of the defense strategy through the learning process. The results also prove the feasibility of the learned attack actions by replicating the disturbances created in simulated power system.
2020-02-17
Paul, Shuva, Ni, Zhen.  2019.  A Strategic Analysis of Attacker-Defender Repeated Game in Smart Grid Security. 2019 IEEE Power Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT). :1–5.

Traditional power grid security schemes are being replaced by highly advanced and efficient smart security schemes due to the advancement in grid structure and inclusion of cyber control and monitoring tools. Smart attackers create physical, cyber, or cyber-physical attacks to gain the access of the power system and manipulate/override system status, measurements and commands. In this paper, we formulate the environment for the attacker-defender interaction in the smart power grid. We provide a strategic analysis of the attacker-defender strategic interaction using a game theoretic approach. We apply repeated game to formulate the problem, implement it in the power system, and investigate for optimal strategic behavior in terms of mixed strategies of the players. In order to define the utility or cost function for the game payoffs calculation, generation power is used. Attack-defense budget is also incorporated with the attacker-defender repeated game to reflect a more realistic scenario. The proposed game model is validated using IEEE 39 bus benchmark system. A comparison between the proposed game model and the all monitoring model is provided to validate the observations.