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Filters: Author is Petroccia, Roberto  [Clear All Filters]
2022-04-19
Tronchin, Davide, Francescon, Roberto, Campagnaro, Filippo, Signori, Alberto, Petroccia, Roberto, Pelekanakis, Konstantinos, Paglierani, Pietro, Alves, João, Zorzi, Michele.  2021.  A Secure Cross-Layer Communication Stack for Underwater Acoustic Networks. OCEANS 2021: San Diego – Porto. :1–8.
Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs) have long been recognized as an instrumental technology in various fields, from ocean monitoring to defense settings. Their security, though, has been scarcely investigated despite the strategic areas involved and the intrinsic vulnerability due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. In this work, we focus on attacks for which the attacker has partial or total knowledge of the network protocol stack. Our strategy uses a watchdog layer that allows upper layers to gather knowledge of overheard packets. In addition, a reputation system that is able to label nodes as trustful or suspicious is analyzed and evaluated via simulations. The proposed security mechanism has been implemented in the DESERT Underwater framework and a simulation study is conducted to validate the effectiveness of the proposed solution against resource exhaustion and sinkhole attacks.
2020-03-02
Pelekanakis, Konstantinos, Gussen, Camila M. G., Petroccia, Roberto, Alves, João.  2019.  Robust Channel Parameters for Crypto Key Generation in Underwater Acoustic Systems. OCEANS 2019 MTS/IEEE SEATTLE. :1–7.
Key management is critical for the successful operation of a cryptographic system in wireless networks. Systems based on asymmetric keys require a dedicated infrastructure for key management and authentication which may not be practical for ad-hoc Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs). In symmetric-key systems, key distribution is not easy to handle when new nodes join the network. In addition, when a key is compromised all nodes that use the same key are not secure anymore. Hence, it is desirable to have a dynamic way to generate new keys without relying on past keys. Physical Layer Security (PLS) uses correlated channel measurements between two underwater nodes to generate a cryptographic key without exchanging the key itself. In this study, we set up a network of two legitimate nodes and one eavesdropper operating in a shallow area off the coast of Portugal. We propose novel features based on the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) of the established acoustic link that could be used as an initial seed for a crypto-key generation algorithm. Our results show that the two nodes can independently generate 306 quantization bits after exchanging 187 probe signals. Furthermore, the eavesdropper fails to generate the same bits from her/his data even if she/he performs exactly the same signal processing steps of the legitimate nodes.