Biblio

The ever increasing need to ensure that code is reliably, efficiently and safely constructed has fueled the evolution of popular static binary code analysis tools. In identifying potential coding flaws in binaries, tools such as IDA Pro are used to disassemble the binaries into an opcode/assembly language format in support of manual static code analysis. Because of the highly manual and resource intensive nature involved with analyzing large binaries, the probability of overlooking potential coding irregularities and inefficiencies is quite high. In this paper, a light-weight, unsupervised data flow methodology is described which uses highly-correlated data flow graph (CDFGs) to identify coding irregularities such that analysis time and required computing resources are minimized. Such analysis accuracy and efficiency gains are achieved by using a combination of graph analysis and unsupervised machine learning techniques which allows an analyst to focus on the most statistically significant flow patterns while performing binary static code analysis.

In recent years the use of security gateways (SG) located within the electrical grid distribution network has become pervasive. SGs in substations and renewable distributed energy resource aggregators (DERAs) protect power distribution control devices from cyber and cyber-physical attacks. When encrypted communications within a DER network is used, TCP/IP packet inspection is restricted to packet header behavioral analysis which in most cases only allows the SG to perform anomaly detection of blocks of time-series data (event windows). Packet header anomaly detection calculates the probability of the presence of a threat within an event window, but fails in such cases where the unreadable encrypted payload contains the attack content. The SG system log (syslog) is a time-series record of behavioral patterns of network users and processes accessing and transferring data through the SG network interfaces. Threatening behavioral pattern in the syslog are measurable using both anomaly detection and graph theory. In this paper it will be shown that it is possible to efficiently detect the presence of and classify a potential threat within an SG syslog using light-weight anomaly detection and graph theory.