Biblio

Traditionally, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have been operated as air-gapped networks, without a necessity to connect directly to the Internet. With the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, along with the cloud computing shift in traditional IT environments, ICS systems went through an adaptation period in the recent years, as the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) became popular. ICS systems, also called Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS), operate on physical devices (i.e., actuators, sensors) at the lowest layer. An anomaly that effect this layer, could potentially result in physical damage. Due to the new attack surfaces that came about with IIoT movement, precise, accurate, and prompt intrusion/anomaly detection is becoming even more crucial in ICS. This paper proposes a novel method for real-time intrusion/anomaly detection based on a cyber-physical system network traffic. To evaluate the proposed anomaly detection method's efficiency, we run our implementation against a network trace taken from a Secure Water Treatment Testbed (SWAT) of iTrust Laboratory at Singapore.

Internet of Things devices have spread to near ubiquity this decade. All around us now lies an invisible mesh of communication from devices embedded in seemingly everything. Inevitably some of that communication flying around our heads will contain data that must be protected or otherwise shielded from tampering. The responsibility to protect this sensitive information from malicious actors as it travels through the air then falls upon the standards used to communicate this data. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is one of these standards, the aim of this paper is to put its security standards to test. By attempting to exploit its vulnerabilities we can see how secure this standard really is. In this paper, we present steps for analyzing the security of BLE devices using open-source hardware and software.