Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Hayashi, Yu-ichi  [Clear All Filters]
2022-07-14
Nagata, Daiya, Hayashi, Yu-ichi, Mizuki, Takaaki, Sone, Hideaki.  2021.  QR Bar-Code Designed Resistant against EM Information Leakage. 2021 XXXIVth General Assembly and Scientific Symposium of the International Union of Radio Science (URSI GASS). :1–4.
A threat of eavesdropping display screen image of information device is caused by unintended EM leakage emanation. QR bar-code is capable of error correction, and its information is possibly read from a damaged screen image from EM leakage. A new design of QR bar-code proposed in this paper uses selected colors in consideration of correlation between the EM wave leakage and display color. Proposed design of QR bar-code keeps error correction of displayed image, and makes it difficult to read information on the eavesdropped image.
2020-09-18
Kaji, Shugo, Kinugawa, Masahiro, Fujimoto, Daisuke, Hayashi, Yu-ichi.  2019.  Data Injection Attack Against Electronic Devices With Locally Weakened Immunity Using a Hardware Trojan. IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility. 61:1115—1121.
Intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) of information and communication devices is based on high-power electromagnetic environments far exceeding the device immunity to electromagnetic interference. IEMI dramatically alters the electromagnetic environment throughout the device by interfering with the electromagnetic waves inside the device and destroying low-tolerance integrated circuits (ICs) and other elements, thereby reducing the availability of the device. In contrast, in this study, by using a hardware Trojan (HT) that is quickly mountable by physically accessing the devices, to locally weaken the immunity of devices, and then irradiating electromagnetic waves of a specific frequency, only the attack targets are intentionally altered electromagnetically. Therefore, we propose a method that uses these electromagnetic changes to rewrite or generate data and commands handled within devices. Specifically, targeting serial communication systems used inside and outside the devices, the installation of an HT on the communication channel weakens local immunity. This shows that it is possible to generate an electrical signal representing arbitrary data on the communication channel by applying electromagnetic waves of sufficiently small output compared with the conventional IEMI and letting the IC process the data. In addition, we explore methods for countering such attacks.