Biblio

In Production System Engineering (PSE), domain experts from different disciplines reuse assets such as products, production processes, and resources. Therefore, PSE organizations aim at establishing reuse across engineering disciplines. However, the coordination of multi-disciplinary reuse tasks, e.g., the re-validation of related assets after changes, is hampered by the coarse-grained representation of tasks and by scattered, heterogeneous domain knowledge. This paper introduces the Multi-disciplinary Reuse Coordination (MRC) artifact to improve task management for multi-disciplinary reuse. For assets and their properties, the MRC artifact describes sub-tasks with progress and result states to provide references for detailed reuse task management across engineering disciplines. In a feasibility study on a typical robot cell in automotive manufacturing, we investigate the effectiveness of task management with the MRC artifact compared to traditional approaches. Results indicate that the MRC artifact is feasible and provides effective capabilities for coordinating multi-disciplinary re-validation after changes.

In Production System Engineering (PSE), domain experts aim at effectively and efficiently analyzing and mitigating information security risks to product and process qualities for manufacturing. However, traditional security standards do not connect security analysis to the value stream of the production system nor to production quality requirements. This paper aims at facilitating security analysis for production quality already in the design phase of PSE. In this paper, we (i) identify the connection between security and production quality, and (ii) introduce the Production Security Network (PSN) to efficiently derive reusable security requirements and design patterns for PSE. We evaluate the PSN with threat scenarios in a feasibility study. The study results indicate that the PSN satisfies the requirements for systematic security analysis. The design patterns provide a good foundation for improving the communication of domain experts by connecting security and quality concerns.

As the connectivity within manufacturing processes increases in light of Industry 4.0, information security becomes a pressing issue for product suppliers, systems integrators, and asset owners. Reaching new heights in digitizing the manufacturing industry also provides more targets for cyber attacks, hence, cyber-physical production systems (CPPSs) must be adequately secured to prevent malicious acts. To achieve a sufficient level of security, proper defense mechanisms must be integrated already early on in the systems' lifecycle and not just eventually in the operation phase. Although standardization efforts exist with the objective of guiding involved stakeholders toward the establishment of a holistic industrial security concept (e.g., IEC 62443), a dedicated security development lifecycle for systems integrators is missing. This represents a major challenge for engineers who lack sufficient information security knowledge, as they may not be able to identify security-related activities that can be performed along the production systems engineering (PSE) process. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology named Security Development Lifecycle for Cyber-Physical Production Systems (SDL-CPPS) that aims to foster security by design for CPPSs, i.e., the engineering of smart production systems with security in mind. More specifically, we derive security-related activities based on (i) security standards and guidelines, and (ii) relevant literature, leading to a security-improved PSE process that can be implemented by systems integrators. Furthermore, this paper informs domain experts on how they can conduct these security-enhancing activities and provides pointers to relevant works that may fill the potential knowledge gap. Finally, we review the proposed approach by means of discussions in a workshop setting with technical managers of an Austrian-based systems integrator to identify barriers to adopting the SDL-CPPS.