Biblio

We investigate the potential of an information-spectrum approach to information-theoretic security. We show how this approach provides conceptually simple yet powerful results that can be used to investigate complex communication scenarios. In particular, we illustrate the usefulness of information-spectrum methods by analyzing the effect of channel state information (CSI) on the secure rates achievable over wiretap channels. We establish a formula for secrecy capacity, which we then specialize to compute achievable rates for ergodic fading channels in the presence of imperfect CSI. Our results confirm the importance of having some knowledge about the eavesdropper's channel, but also show that imperfect CSI does not necessarily preclude security.

This paper considers the transmission of confidential data over wireless channels. Based on an information-theoretic formulation of the problem, in which two legitimates partners communicate over a quasi-static fading channel and an eavesdropper observes their transmissions through a second independent quasi-static fading channel, the important role of fading is characterized in terms of average secure communication rates and outage probability. Based on the insights from this analysis, a practical secure communication protocol is developed, which uses a four-step procedure to ensure wireless information-theoretic security: (i) common randomness via opportunistic transmission, (ii) message reconciliation, (iii) common key generation via privacy amplification, and (iv) message protection with a secret key. A reconciliation procedure based on multilevel coding and optimized low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes is introduced, which allows to achieve communication rates close to the fundamental security limits in several relevant instances. Finally, a set of metrics for assessing average secure key generation rates is established, and it is shown that the protocol is effective in secure key renewal-even in the presence of imperfect channel state information.

We consider the problem of covert communication when Channel State Information (CSI) is available non-causally, causally, and strictly causally at both transmitter and receiver, as well as the case when channel state information is only available at the transmitter. Covert communication with respect to an adversary referred to as the "warden", is one in which the distribution induced during communication at the channel output observed by the warden is identical to the output distribution conditioned on an innocent channel-input symbol. In contrast to previous work, we do not assume the availability of a shared key at the transmitter and legitimate receiver; instead shared randomness is extracted from the channel state, in a manner that keeps it secret from the warden despite the influence of the channel state on the warden's output. When CSI is available at both transmitter and receiver, we derive the covert capacity region; when CSI is only available at the transmitter, we derive inner and outer bounds on the covert capacity. We also derive the covert capacity when the warden's channel is less noisy with respect to the legitimate receiver. We provide examples for which covert capacity is zero without channel state information, but is positive in the presence of channel state information.