Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Huth, C. L.  [Clear All Filters]
2021-04-08
Mundie, D. A., Perl, S., Huth, C. L..  2013.  Toward an Ontology for Insider Threat Research: Varieties of Insider Threat Definitions. 2013 Third Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust. :26—36.
The lack of standardization of the terms insider and insider threat has been a noted problem for researchers in the insider threat field. This paper describes the investigation of 42 different definitions of the terms insider and insider threat, with the goal of better understanding the current conceptual model of insider threat and facilitating communication in the research community.
Claycomb, W. R., Huth, C. L., Phillips, B., Flynn, L., McIntire, D..  2013.  Identifying indicators of insider threats: Insider IT sabotage. 2013 47th International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST). :1—5.
This paper describes results of a study seeking to identify observable events related to insider sabotage. We collected information from actual insider threat cases, created chronological timelines of the incidents, identified key points in each timeline such as when attack planning began, measured the time between key events, and looked for specific observable events or patterns that insiders held in common that may indicate insider sabotage is imminent or likely. Such indicators could be used by security experts to potentially identify malicious activity at or before the time of attack. Our process included critical steps such as identifying the point of damage to the organization as well as any malicious events prior to zero hour that enabled the attack but did not immediately cause harm. We found that nearly 71% of the cases we studied had either no observable malicious action prior to attack, or had one that occurred less than one day prior to attack. Most of the events observed prior to attack were behavioral, not technical, especially those occurring earlier in the case timelines. Of the observed technical events prior to attack, nearly one third involved installation of software onto the victim organizations IT systems.