Biblio

Traditionally, the management of power distribution networks relies on the centralized implementation of the optimal power flow and, in particular, the minimization of the generation cost and transmission losses. Nevertheless, the increasing penetration of both renewable energy sources and independent players such as ancillary service providers in modern networks have made this centralized framework inadequate. Against this background, we propose a noncooperative game-theoretic framework for optimally controlling energy storage systems (ESSs) in power distribution networks. Specifically, in this paper we address a power grid model that comprehends traditional loads, distributed generation sources and several independent energy storage providers, each owning an individual ESS. Through a rolling-horizon approach, the latter participate in the grid optimization process, aiming both at increasing the penetration of distributed generation and leveling the power injection from the transmission grid. Our framework incorporates not only economic factors but also grid stability aspects, including the power flow constraints. The paper fully describes the distribution grid model as well as the underlying market hypotheses and policies needed to force the energy storage providers to find a feasible equilibrium for the network. Numerical experiments based on the IEEE 33-bus system confirm the effectiveness and resiliency of the proposed framework.