Biblio

Mobile data offloading using opportunistic network has recently gained its significance to increase mobile data needs. Such offloaders need to be properly incentivized to encourage more and more users to act as helpers in such networks. The extent of help offered by mobile data offloading alternatives using appropriate incentive mechanisms is significant in such scenarios. The limitation of existing incentive mechanisms is that they are partial in implementation while most of them use third party intervention based derivation. However, none of the papers considers trust as an essential factor for incentive distribution. Although few works contribute to the trust analysis, but the implementation is limited to offloading determination only while the incentive is independent of trust. We try to investigate if trust could be related to the Nash equilibrium based incentive evaluation. Our analysis results show that trust-based incentive distribution encourages more than 50% offloaders to act positively and contribute successfully towards efficient mobile data offloading. We compare the performance of our algorithm with literature based salary-bonus scheme implementation and get optimum incentive beyond 20% dependence over trust-based output.