Biblio

This chapter presents a game‐theoretic model to analyze attack–defense scenarios that use fake nodes (computing devices) for deception under consideration of the system deploying defense resources to protect individual nodes in a cost‐effective manner. The developed model has important applications in the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT). Our game‐theoretic model illustrates how the concept of the Nash equilibrium can be used by the defender to intelligently choose which nodes should be used for performing a computation task while deceiving the attacker into expending resources for attacking fake nodes. Our model considers the fact that defense resources may become compromised under an attack and suggests that the defender, in a probabilistic manner, may utilize unprotected nodes for performing a computation while the attacker is deceived into attacking a node with defense resources installed. The chapter also presents a deception‐based strategy to protect a target node that can be accessed via a tree network. Numerical results provide insights into the strategic deception techniques presented in this chapter.