Biblio

The 5G technology brings the substantial improvement on the quality of services (QoS), such as higher throughput, lower latency, more stable signal and more ultra-reliable data transmission, triggering a revolution for the wireless mobile network. But in a general traffic channel in the 5G-based wireless mobile network, an attacker can detect a message transmitted over a channel, or even worse, forge or tamper with the message. Building a secure channel over the two parties is a feasible solution to this uttermost data transmission security challenge in 5G-based wireless mobile network. However, how to authentication the identities of the both parties before establishing the secure channel to fully ensure the data confidentiality and integrity during the data transmission has still been a open issue. To establish a fully secure channel, in this paper, we propose a strongly secure pairing-free certificateless authenticated key agreement (PF-CL-AKA) protocol with two-way identity-based authentication before extracting the secure session key. Our protocol is provably secure in the Lippold model, which means our protocol is still secure as long as each party of the channel has at least one uncompromised partial private term. Finally, By the theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, we can observe that our scheme is practical for the real-world applications in the 5G-based wireless mobile network.