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2023-01-06
Golatkar, Aditya, Achille, Alessandro, Wang, Yu-Xiang, Roth, Aaron, Kearns, Michael, Soatto, Stefano.  2022.  Mixed Differential Privacy in Computer Vision. 2022 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). :8366—8376.
We introduce AdaMix, an adaptive differentially private algorithm for training deep neural network classifiers using both private and public image data. While pre-training language models on large public datasets has enabled strong differential privacy (DP) guarantees with minor loss of accuracy, a similar practice yields punishing trade-offs in vision tasks. A few-shot or even zero-shot learning baseline that ignores private data can outperform fine-tuning on a large private dataset. AdaMix incorporates few-shot training, or cross-modal zero-shot learning, on public data prior to private fine-tuning, to improve the trade-off. AdaMix reduces the error increase from the non-private upper bound from the 167–311% of the baseline, on average across 6 datasets, to 68-92% depending on the desired privacy level selected by the user. AdaMix tackles the trade-off arising in visual classification, whereby the most privacy sensitive data, corresponding to isolated points in representation space, are also critical for high classification accuracy. In addition, AdaMix comes with strong theoretical privacy guarantees and convergence analysis.
2022-03-15
Aghakhani, Hojjat, Meng, Dongyu, Wang, Yu-Xiang, Kruegel, Christopher, Vigna, Giovanni.  2021.  Bullseye Polytope: A Scalable Clean-Label Poisoning Attack with Improved Transferability. 2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :159—178.
A recent source of concern for the security of neural networks is the emergence of clean-label dataset poisoning attacks, wherein correctly labeled poison samples are injected into the training dataset. While these poison samples look legitimate to the human observer, they contain malicious characteristics that trigger a targeted misclassification during inference. We propose a scalable and transferable clean-label poisoning attack against transfer learning, which creates poison images with their center close to the target image in the feature space. Our attack, Bullseye Polytope, improves the attack success rate of the current state-of-the-art by 26.75% in end-to-end transfer learning, while increasing attack speed by a factor of 12. We further extend Bullseye Polytope to a more practical attack model by including multiple images of the same object (e.g., from different angles) when crafting the poison samples. We demonstrate that this extension improves attack transferability by over 16% to unseen images (of the same object) without using extra poison samples.