Biblio

The digital transformation brought on by 5G is redefining current models of end-to-end (E2E) connectivity and service reliability to include security-by-design principles necessary to enable 5G to achieve its promise. 5G trustworthiness highlights the importance of embedding security capabilities from the very beginning while the 5G architecture is being defined and standardized. Security requirements need to overlay and permeate through the different layers of 5G systems (physical, network, and application) as well as different parts of an E2E 5G architecture within a risk-management framework that takes into account the evolving security-threats landscape. 5G presents a typical use-case of wireless communication and computer networking convergence, where 5G fundamental building blocks include components such as Software Defined Networks (SDN), Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and the edge cloud. This convergence extends many of the security challenges and opportunities applicable to SDN/NFV and cloud to 5G networks. Thus, 5G security needs to consider additional security requirements (compared to previous generations) such as SDN controller security, hypervisor security, orchestrator security, cloud security, edge security, etc. At the same time, 5G networks offer security improvement opportunities that should be considered. Here, 5G architectural flexibility, programmability and complexity can be harnessed to improve resilience and reliability. The working group scope fundamentally addresses the following: •5G security considerations need to overlay and permeate through the different layers of the 5G systems (physical, network, and application) as well as different parts of an E2E 5G architecture including a risk management framework that takes into account the evolving security threats landscape. •5G exemplifies a use-case of heterogeneous access and computer networking convergence, which extends a unique set of security challenges and opportunities (e.g., related to SDN/NFV and edge cloud, etc.) to 5G networks. Similarly, 5G networks by design offer potential security benefits and opportunities through harnessing the architecture flexibility, programmability and complexity to improve its resilience and reliability. •The IEEE FNI security WG's roadmap framework follows a taxonomic structure, differentiating the 5G functional pillars and corresponding cybersecurity risks. As part of cross collaboration, the security working group will also look into the security issues associated with other roadmap working groups within the IEEE Future Network Initiative.

In this work we investigate existing and new metrics for evaluating transient stability of power systems to quantify the impact of distributed control schemes. Specifically, an energy storage system (ESS)-based control scheme that builds on feedback linearization theory is implemented in the power system to enhance its transient stability. We study the value of incorporating such ESS-based distributed control on specific transient stability metrics that include critical clearing time, critical control activation time, system stability time, rotor angle stability index, rotor speed stability index, rate of change of frequency, and control power. The stability metrics are evaluated using the IEEE 68-bus test power system. Numerical results demonstrate the value of the distributed control scheme in enhancing the transient stability metrics of power systems.

In this work we investigate existing and new metrics for evaluating transient stability of power systems to quantify the impact of distributed control schemes. Specifically, an energy storage system (ESS)-based control scheme that builds on feedback linearization theory is implemented in the power system to enhance its transient stability. We study the value of incorporating such ESS-based distributed control on specific transient stability metrics that include critical clearing time, critical control activation time, system stability time, rotor angle stability index, rotor speed stability index, rate of change of frequency, and control power. The stability metrics are evaluated using the IEEE 68-bus test power system. Numerical results demonstrate the value of the distributed control scheme in enhancing the transient stability metrics of power systems.

While power grid systems benefit from utilizing communication network through networked control and protection, the addition of communication exposes the power system to new security vulnerabilities and potential attacks. To mitigate these attacks, such as denial of service, intrusion detection systems (IDS) are often employed. In this paper we investigate the relationship of IDS accuracy performance to the stability of power systems via its impact on communication latency. Several IDS machine learning algorithms are implemented on the NSL-KDD dataset to obtain accuracy performance, and a mathematical model for computing the latency when incorporating IDS detection information during network routing is introduced. Simulation results on the New England 39-bus power system suggest that during a cyber-physical attack, a practical IDS can achieve similar stability as an ideal IDS with perfect detection. In addition, false positive rate has been found to have a larger impact than false negative rate under the simulation conditions studied. These observations can contribute to the design requirements of future embedded IDS solutions for power systems.