Biblio

Dynamic memory allocators are critical components of modern systems, and developers strive to find a balance between their performance and their security. Unfortunately, vulnerable allocators are routinely abused as building blocks in complex exploitation chains. Most of the research regarding memory allocators focuses on popular and standardized heap libraries, generally used by high-end devices such as desktop systems and servers. However, dynamic memory allocators are also extensively used in embedded systems but they have not received much scrutiny from the security community.In embedded systems, a raw firmware image is often the only available piece of information, and finding heap vulnerabilities is a manual and tedious process. First of all, recognizing a memory allocator library among thousands of stripped firmware functions can quickly become a daunting task. Moreover, emulating firmware functions to test for heap vulnerabilities comes with its own set of challenges, related, but not limited, to the re-hosting problem.To fill this gap, in this paper we present HEAPSTER, a system that automatically identifies the heap library used by a monolithic firmware image, and tests its security with symbolic execution and bounded model checking. We evaluate HEAPSTER on a dataset of 20 synthetic monolithic firmware images — used as ground truth for our analyses — and also on a dataset of 799 monolithic firmware images collected in the wild and used in real-world devices. Across these datasets, our tool identified 11 different heap management library (HML) families containing a total of 48 different variations. The security testing performed by HEAPSTER found that all the identified variants are vulnerable to at least one critical heap vulnerability. The results presented in this paper show a clear pattern of poor security standards, and raise some concerns over the security of dynamic memory allocators employed by IoT devices.