Biblio

Keystroke Dynamics can be used as an unobtrusive method to enhance password authentication, by checking the typing rhythm of the user. Fixed passwords will give an attacker the possibility to try to learn to mimic the typing behaviour of a victim. In this paper we will investigate the performance of a keystroke dynamic (KD) system when the users have to type given (English) words. Under the assumption that it is easy to type words in your native language and difficult in a foreign language will we also test the performance of such a challenge-based KD system when the challenges are not common English words, but words in the native language of the user. We collected data from participants with 6 different native language backgrounds and had them type random 8-12 character words in each of the 6 languages. The participants also typed random English words and random French words. English was assumed to be a language familiar to all participants, while French was not a native language to any participant and most likely most participants were not fluent in French. Analysis showed that using language dependent words gave a better performance of the challenge-based KD compared to an all English challenge-based system. When using words in a native language, then the performance of the participants with their mother-tongue equal to that native language had a similar performance compared to the all English challenge-based system, but the non-native speakers had an FMR that was significantly lower than the native language speakers. We found that native Telugu speakers had an FMR of less than 1% when writing Spanish or Slovak words. We also found that duration features were best to recognize genuine users, but latency features performed best to recognize non-native impostor users.

It is accepted that the way a person types on a keyboard contains timing patterns, which can be used to classify him/her, is known as keystroke dynamics. Keystroke dynamics is a behavioural biometric modality, whose performances, however, are worse than morphological modalities such as fingerprint, iris recognition or face recognition. To cope with this, we propose to combine keystroke dynamics with soft biometrics. Soft biometrics refers to biometric characteristics that are not sufficient to authenticate a user (e.g. height, gender, skin/eye/hair colour). Concerning keystroke dynamics, three soft categories are considered: gender, age and handedness. We present different methods to combine the results of a classical keystroke dynamics system with such soft criteria. By applying simple sum and multiply rules, our experiments suggest that the combination approach performs better than the classification approach with best result of 5.41% of equal error rate. The efficiency of our approaches is illustrated on a public database.

Continuous Authentication by analysing the user's behaviour profile on the computer input devices is challenging due to limited information, variability of data and the sparse nature of the information. As a result, most of the previous research was done as a periodic authentication, where the analysis was made based on a fixed number of actions or fixed time period. Also, the experimental data was obtained for most of the previous research in a very controlled condition, where the task and environment were fixed. In this paper, we will focus on actual continuous authentication that reacts on every single action performed by the user. The experimental data was collected in a complete uncontrolled condition from 52 users by using our data collection software. In our analysis, we have considered both keystroke and mouse usages behaviour pattern to avoid a situation where an attacker avoids detection by restricting to one input device because the continuous authentication system only checks the other input device. The result we have obtained from this research is satisfactory enough for further investigation on this domain.

In this research, we focus on context independent continuous authentication that reacts on every separate action performed by a user. The experimental data was collected in a complete uncontrolled condition from 53 users by using our data collection software. In our analysis, we considered both keystroke and mouse usage behaviour patterns to prevent a situation where an attacker avoids detection by restricting to one input device because the continuous authentication system only checks the other input device. The best result obtained from this research is that for 47 bio-metric subjects we have on average 275 actions required to detect an imposter where these biometric subjects are never locked out from the system.