Biblio

Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds such as OpenStack consist of two kinds of nodes in their infrastructure: control nodes and compute nodes. While control nodes run all critical services, compute nodes host virtual machines of customers. Given the large number of compute nodes, and the fact that they are hosting VMs of (possibly malicious) customers, it is possible that some of the compute nodes may be compromised. This paper examines the impact of such a compromise. We focus on OpenStack, a popular open-source cloud plat- form that is widely adopted. We show that attackers com- promising a single compute node can extend their controls over the entire cloud infrastructure. They can then gain free access to resources that they have not paid for, or even bring down the whole cloud to affect all customers. This startling result stems from the cloud platform's misplaced trust, which does not match today's threats. To overcome the weakness, we propose a new system, called SOS , for hardening OpenStack. SOS limits trust on compute nodes. SOS consists of a framework that can enforce a wide range of security policies. Specifically, we applied mandatory access control and capabilities to con- fine interactions among different components. Effective confinement policies are generated automatically. Furthermore, SOS requires no modifications to the OpenStack. This has allowed us to deploy SOS on multiple versions of OpenStack. Our experimental results demonstrate that SOS is scalable, incurs negligible overheads and offers strong protection.