Biblio

A security breach often makes companies react by changing their attitude and approach to security within the organization. This paper presents an in-depth case study of post-breach security changes made by a company and the consequences of those changes. We employ the principles of participatory action research and humble inquiry to conduct a long-term study with employee interviews while embedded in the organization's security division. Despite an extremely high level of financial investment in security, and consistent attention and involvement from the board, the interviews indicate a significant level of friction between employees and security. In the main themes that emerged from our data analysis, a number of factors shed light on the friction: fear of another breach leading to zero risk appetite, impossible security controls making non-compliance a norm, security theatre underminining the purpose of security policies, employees often trading-off security with productivity, and as such being treated as children in detention rather than employees trying to finish their paid jobs. This paper shows that post-breach security changes can be complex and sometimes risky due to emotions often being involved. Without an approach considerate of how humans and security interact, even with high financial investment, attempts to change an organization's security behaviour may be ineffective.

Reputation systems in current electronic marketplaces can easily be manipulated by malicious sellers in order to appear more reputable than appropriate. We conducted a controlled experiment with 40 UK and 41 German participants on their ability to detect malicious behavior by means of an eBay-like feedback profile versus a novel interface involving an interactive visualization of reputation data. The results show that participants using the new interface could better detect and understand malicious behavior in three out of four attacks (the overall detection accuracy 77% in the new vs. 56% in the old interface). Moreover, with the new interface, only 7% of the users decided to buy from the malicious seller (the options being to buy from one of the available sellers or to abstain from buying), as opposed to 30% in the old interface condition.