Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Harang, Richard  [Clear All Filters]
2019-02-22
Dauber, Edwin, Caliskan, Aylin, Harang, Richard, Greenstadt, Rachel.  2018.  Git Blame Who?: Stylistic Authorship Attribution of Small, Incomplete Source Code Fragments Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Software Engineering: Companion Proceeedings. :356-357.

Program authorship attribution has implications for the privacy of programmers who wish to contribute code anonymously. While previous work has shown that complete files that are individually authored can be attributed, these efforts have focused on ideal data sets such as the Google Code Jam data. We explore the problem of attribution "in the wild," examining source code obtained from open source version control systems, and investigate if and how such contributions can be attributed to their authors, either individually or on a per-account basis. In this work we show that accounts belonging to open source contributors containing short, incomplete, and typically uncompilable fragments can be effectively attributed.

2018-03-26
Thompson, Brian, Harang, Richard.  2017.  Identifying Key Cyber-Physical Terrain. Proceedings of the 3rd ACM on International Workshop on Security And Privacy Analytics. :23–28.

The high mobility of Army tactical networks, combined with their close proximity to hostile actors, elevates the risks associated with short-range network attacks. The connectivity model for such short range connections under active operations is extremely fluid, and highly dependent upon the physical space within which the element is operating, as well as the patterns of movement within that space. To handle these dependencies, we introduce the notion of "key cyber-physical terrain": locations within an area of operations that allow for effective control over the spread of proximity-dependent malware in a mobile tactical network, even as the elements of that network are in constant motion with an unpredictable pattern of node-to-node connectivity. We provide an analysis of movement models and approximation strategies for finding such critical nodes, and demonstrate via simulation that we can identify such key cyber-physical terrain quickly and effectively.

2017-05-17
Mell, Peter, Shook, James, Harang, Richard.  2016.  Measuring and Improving the Effectiveness of Defense-in-Depth Postures. Proceedings of the 2Nd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop. :15–22.

Defense-in-depth is an important security architecture principle that has significant application to industrial control systems (ICS), cloud services, storehouses of sensitive data, and many other areas. We claim that an ideal defense-in-depth posture is 'deep', containing many layers of security, and 'narrow', the number of node independent attack paths is minimized. Unfortunately, accurately calculating both depth and width is difficult using standard graph algorithms because of a lack of independence between multiple vulnerability instances (i.e., if an attacker can penetrate a particular vulnerability on one host then they can likely penetrate the same vulnerability on another host). To address this, we represent known weaknesses and vulnerabilities as a type of colored attack graph. We measure depth and width through solving the shortest color path and minimum color cut problems. We prove both of these to be NP-Hard and thus for our solution we provide a suite of greedy heuristics. We then empirically apply our approach to large randomly generated networks as well as to ICS networks generated from a published ICS attack template. Lastly, we discuss how to use these results to help guide improvements to defense-in-depth postures.