Biblio
In previous multi-authority key-policy attribute-based Encryption (KP-ABE) schemes, either a super power central authority (CA) exists, or multiple attribute authorities (AAs) must collaborate in initializing the system. In addition, those schemes are proved security in the selective model. In this paper, we propose a new fully secure decentralized KP-ABE scheme, where no CA exists and there is no cooperation between any AAs. To become an AA, a participant needs to create and publish its public parameters. All the user's private keys will be linked with his unique global identifier (GID). The proposed scheme supports any monotonic access structure which can be expressed by a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS). We prove the full security of our scheme in the standard model. Our scheme is also secure against at most F-1 AAs corruption, where F is the number of AAs in the system. The efficiency of our scheme is almost as well as that of the underlying fully secure single-authority KP-ABE system.
The disclosure of an important yet sensitive link may cause serious privacy crisis between two users of a social graph. Only deleting the sensitive link referred to as a target link which is often the attacked target of adversaries is not enough, because the adversarial link prediction can deeply forecast the existence of the missing target link. Thus, to defend some specific adversarial link prediction, a budget limited number of other non-target links should be optimally removed. We first propose a path-based dissimilarity function as the optimizing objective and prove that the greedy link deletion to preserve target link privacy referred to as the GLD2Privacy which has monotonicity and submodularity properties can achieve a near optimal solution. However, emulating all length limited paths between any pair of nodes for GLD2Privacy mechanism is impossible in large scale social graphs. Secondly, we propose a Walk2Privacy mechanism that uses self-avoiding random walk which can efficiently run in large scale graphs to sample the paths of given lengths between the two ends of any missing target link, and based on the sampled paths we select the alternative non-target links being deleted for privacy purpose. Finally, we compose experiments to demonstrate that the Walk2Privacy algorithm can remarkably reduce the time consumption and achieve a very near solution that is achieved by the GLD2Privacy.
Routers are important devices in the networks that carry the burden of transmitting information among the communication devices on the Internet. If a malicious adversary wants to intercept the information or paralyze the network, it can directly attack the routers and then achieve the suspicious goals. Thus, preventing router security is of great importance. However, router systems are notoriously difficult to understand or diagnose for their inaccessibility and heterogeneity. The common way of gaining access to the router system and detecting the anomaly behaviors is to inspect the router syslogs or monitor the packets of information flowing to the routers. These approaches just diagnose the routers from one aspect but do not consider them from multiple views. In this paper, we propose an approach to detect the anomalies and faults of the routers with multiple information learning. We try to use the routers' information not from the developer's view but from the user' s view, which does not need any expert knowledge. First, we do the offline learning to transform the benign or corrupted user actions into the syslogs. Then, we try to decide whether the input routers' conditions are poor or not with clustering. During the detection phase, we use the distance between the event and the cluster to decide if it is the anomaly event and we can provide the corresponding solutions. We have applied our approach in a university network which contains Cisco, Huawei and Dlink routers for three months. We aligned our experiment with former work as a baseline for comparison. Our approach can gain 89.6% accuracy in detecting the attacks which is 5.1% higher than the former work. The results show that our approach performs in limited time as well as memory usages and has high detection and low false positives.
Denial of service (DoS) attack is a great threaten to privacy-preserving authentication protocols for low-cost devices such as RFID. During such attack, the legal internal states can be consumed by the DoS attack. Then the attacker can observe the behavior of the attacked tag in authentication to break privacy. Due to the inadequate energy and computing power, the low cost devices can hardly defend against the DoS attacks. In this paper, we propose a new insight of the DoS attack on tags and leverage the attacking behavior as a new source of power harvesting. In this way, a low-cost device such as a tag grows more and more powerful under DoS attack. Finally, it can defend against the DoS attack. We further propose a protocol that enables DoS-defending constant-time privacy-preserving authentication.